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Abstract
Source credibility has been observed to produce favorable, neutral, and
sometimes even unfavorable effects on attitudes in persuasion contexts. These
diverse and conflicting findings can best be reconciled if it is first recognized
that effects due to variations in source credibility on attitude are likely to be
mediated by multiple distinct mechanisms or processes. In this paper, we discuss
several such mediating processes, and consider the conditions under which they
are likely to operate. We also discuss empirical evidence supporting the
existence of these processes, and explicate the implications of this research for
the use of credible sources in advertising. Finally, we suggest several issues for
future research.

Mediating Processes for Source Credibility Effects in Advertising:
Review, Implications, and Future Research Directions
It has long been recognized that characteristics of the source of an
advertisement (either explicitly identified or implicitly understood) can influence
ad effects on the recipient. In particular, the use of a credible spokesperson in
advertising is commonplace, and clearly based on the assumption that source
credibility improves the persuasive impact of advertising messages. Given the
intuitive appeal and early empirical support for this assumption (Hovland and
Weiss 1951), it is not surprising that there has been minimal recent research
examining the effects of credibility on persuasion in advertising contexts (for
exceptions, see Frieden 1984; Friedman and Friedman 1979; Harmon and Coney
1982; Mizerski, Hunt, and Patti 1978). However, a growing body of evidence in
the psychology literature suggests that source credibility effects on persuasion
are far more complex than previously believed. Specifically, this literature
suggests that (a) source credibility may have favorable, neutral, and sometimes
even unfavorable effects on post exposure attitude towards the communication
topic, (b) these effects appear to be highly contingent on the specific levels of
other individual difference variables (e.g., involvement, prior knowledge) and
situational variables (e.g., modality, time compression, channel noise) that are
operating in the reception environment, and (c) a number of different
theoretical models and frameworks such as Kelman's functional approach to
social influence processes (Friedman and Friedman 1979; Mills and Harvey 1972),
the Yale reinforcement approach to persuasion (Maddux and Rogers 1980)
,
cognitive response theory (Hass 1981; Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt 1978),
attribution theory (Dholakia and Sternthal 1977), and the Elaboration Likelihood
Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1984, 1986a, 1986b) can account for these effects to
varying degrees. Thus, advertisers are faced with an array of apparently
conflicting findings and competing explanations as they consider the merits of
using credible sources in their communications.
In this paper, we present a synthesis of recent research on source
credibility effects in persuasion, and consider the implications of this research
for advertising practitioners. Our focus here is primarily on attitudinal effects
(see Sternthal, Phillips, and Dholakia 1978 for a review of the literature on
behavioral effects due to source credibility) . Extant literature suggests that
source credibility can produce both direct and indirect effects on attitude
towards the advertised object. By direct effects, we mean that source credibility
influences final attitude without affecting processing of the ad message itself.
Indirect effects refer to the possibility that source credibility affects attitude
by modifying, changing, or otherwise altering message processing activity. In
the following sections, we discuss several direct and indirect mediating
mechanisms for credibility effects on attitude that have been proposed in the
literature. We also examine the conditions under which these mechanisms are
likely to operate from the perspective of two currently popular theoretical
frameworks proposed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986a) and Sternthal, Dholakia,
and Leavitt (1978). Finally, we discuss the implications of each of these
mediating mechanisms for source credibility effects in advertising, and isolate
several research issues that hold special promise for future research.
Direct Effects
Direct effects due to credibility on attitude in a persuasion context have
been most clearly explicated in research on central versus peripheral routes to
persuasion by Petty, Cacioppo, and their colleagues (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, and
Goldman 198.1). In this framework, recipients of a persuasive message can adopt
one of two distinct processing strategies as they examine the message. A
central route to persuasion is said to occur if the recipients carefully examine
and process those cues in the message that they believe are central to a
meaningful and logical evaluation of the communication object. In contrast, a
peripheral route to persuasion results when recipients evaluate the
communication object based on a rather cursory and superficial analysis of
readily available and salient cues in the communication, regardless of whether
or not these cues are meaningfully related to the communication object.
Specifically, attitudes may be formed or changed via peripheral processing either
because the object is associated with positive or negative cues, or because the
individual can make a quick evaluative inference about the object based on
simple cues in the persuasion context.
Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981; Petty and Cacioppo 1986a) have
proposed that motivation and ability to process a communication are the key
determinants of whether central or peripheral processing will occur in a
particular situation. Motivation to process depends on such antecedent variables
as involvement with the communication issue, need for cognition, and
forewarning about the persuasive intent of a communication, while ability may
be determined by both intrinsic factors such as prior knowledge and expertise,
and situational factors such as level of distraction and noise in the message
reception environment (see Petty and Cacioppo 1986b; Batra and Ray 1986;
Andrews 1988 for a detailed discussion on the antecedents of motivation and
ability to process persuasive communication) . High motivation and ability to
process (e.g, high involvement with and knowledge about the communication
issue) leads to central processing, whereas peripheral processing results if either
the motivation or the ability to process the communication is low.
The "two routes to persuasion" framework suggests that source
characteristics such as credibility can have direct effects on attitude under both
central and peripheral processing. To illustrate, consider an advertisement for
brand X cereal which shows a physician eating the cereal, and also makes the
claims that (a) brand X is high in fiber, and (b) brand X stays crunchy in milk.
Under central processing, information about the source as well as other stated
claims in the ad are likely to be considered relevant to judging the true merits
of brand X. Thus, source credibility and believability of the stated claims should
independently contribute to the overall evaluation of the brand. In this
instance, the source is acting as a persuasive argument (i.e., a central cue), and
is processed in a manner akin to other arguments or claims in the message.
Under peripheral processing, recipients are not expected to diligently process
the stated claims in the message. However, the picture of a credible source
consuming the product could be used to rapidly generate a favorable evaluation
of brand X. In this case, the credible source acts as a peripheral cue that
triggers an overlearned heuristic (i.e., expert sources should be trusted).
There is now considerable empirical evidence to support the claim for
direct credibility effects on attitude -- especially under peripheral processing.
For instance, Petty and Cacioppo (1986a) have shown that when subjects are
uninvolved with an advocacy message (and hence unmotivated to process the
message), attitude is strongly affected by a peripheral cue such as source
credibility, but is unaffected by the quality of arguments in the message.
Similarly, Kiesler and Mathog (1968) obtained strong effects due to source
credibility on attitude only when distraction was high -- i.e., when subjects
were in a peripheral processing mode. In contrast, evidence supporting
credibility effects under central processing is more limited (see Dean, Austin,
and Watts 1971) suggesting, perhaps, that these effects are weaker, and harder
to isolate. A likely reason for this is that persuasive arguments in the message
are perceived to be more relevant to judging the true merits of an advocacy,
and hence overshadow the effects of other variables such as source credibility
when involvement is high.
The preceding analysis generates relatively straightforward implications for
the use of credible sources in advertising. Direct effects of source credibility
are expected to follow the intuitively appealing experto crede phenomenon --
credible sources should consistently produce more favorable attitudinal effects
than sources lacking in credibility. The timing of source introduction should not
influence the strength of these effects since the source does not exert its
influence on attitude by first affecting message processing. Consequently, the
advertiser has considerable latitude in deciding whether a source should be
introduced early or late in a commercial message.
Note that although source credibility is expected to produce similar
(positive) direct effects under both central and peripheral processing, there are
differences which have significant consequences for advertising. Attitudinal
effects induced through central processing are based on a detailed assessment of
message content, and are thus likely to be more enduring, and less susceptible
to counterattack than changes induced via the peripheral route (see Petty and
Cacioppo 1986a for details) . Consequently, credibility effects under peripheral
processing would need to be frequently augmented (perhaps via repetition, and
through point of purchase reminders) unless only short term attitudinal and
behavioral impact is desired. In contrast, relatively few exposures should be
sufficient to maintain effects through central processing, although the
magnitude of these effects is likely to be more modest.
The variables that moderate direct effects due to source credibility on
attitude will also markedly differ depending on which of the two routes to
persuasion is being followed. Under central processing, the effects of a cue on
attitude are contingent on the persuasive quality of that cue, i.e., the extent to
which that cue is considered relevant to logically assessing the communication
object. Thus, the source cue should compete with other "central" cues in the ad
reception environment (e.g., persuasive quality of message arguments) for impact
on attitude. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that very strong or very
weak messages may dilute, or even completely eliminate credibility effects when
involvement is high (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman 1981). Thus, it may be
fruitful for advertisers to employ credible sources only when other central cues
such as message quality are either non-existent or at moderate levels. Under
peripheral processing, the relative impact of peripheral cues in the ad (such as
credibility, source attractiveness, spontaneous emotional responses, ad
attractiveness, etc.) should depend on the relative salience and vividness of
these cues -- i.e., the ease with which these cues can be attended to and
processed. This suggests, for instance, that if the spokesperson in an
advertisement is both attractive and credible, we would expect attitudinal
effects due to attractiveness to be stronger because of the vividness of this
cue. Evidence supporting this claim was obtained in a study on endorser effects
by Pallak, Murroni, and Koch (1984). Support for effects due to vividness of a
source cue under peripheral processing is also provided by Chaiken and Eagly
(1983) who obtained stronger source effects for audio- visual messages (vivid
source cue) than for print messages (less vivid cue)
.
Needed Research. Many of the practical implications for source credibility
effects that were drawn in the previous section are untested, and deserve
future research attention. For instance, several studies designed to investigate
the "sleeper effect" phenomenon have shown that credibility-induced attitudinal
effects decay rapidly over time (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Kelman and Hovland
1953; Shulman and Worrall 1970; Watts and McGuire 1964; see Gillig and
Greenwald 1974 for a review, Maddux and Rogers 1980 for an exception)
.
However, these data cannot be interpreted as support for the transient nature
of credibility effects under peripheral processing since there is no evidence to
indicate that the subjects in these studies engaged in peripheral processing
during message exposure. Only one study (Chaiken 1980) has demonstrated that
source effects under peripheral processing decay relatively rapidly over time,
but this study manipulated source attractiveness, not credibility. Furthermore,
there is no evidence to support the predictions regarding differential effects
due to ad repetition or point of purchase information on credibility -induced
attitudes under central versus peripheral processing.
Also note that virtually all of the evidence on direct effects due to
credibility under peripheral processing that we have cited was obtained in lab
studies where source credibility was the only peripheral cue available to
subjects (see Maddux and Rogers 1980; Pallak, Murroni, and Koch 1984 for
exceptions)
. In contrast, endorsers used in real advertisements frequently
provide multiple peripheral cues to audiences. Peripheral cues are also available
from other ad features such as background music or scenery. For instance, a
print ad might use a credible celebrity in conjunction with attractive
background scenery and a lengthy message. Here, source credibility, source
celebrity, source attractiveness, ad attractiveness, and message length could all
potentially influence attitude through peripheral processing. Little is currently
understood about the relative strength of credibility effects in such realistic
multiple cue environments.
Second, future research needs to focus more carefully on the proposed
mediators of direct effects due to source credibility on attitude. For instance,
since uninvolved audiences are expected to rely on the credibility cue to bypass
message processing, one would expect such audiences to (a) generate fewer
message-related cognitive responses, (b) generate more source -related cognitive
responses, and (c) exhibit lower levels of message recall compared to involved
audiences. Unfortunately, cognitive response and recall data are rarely obtained
in source credibility research. Furthermore, those studies that have measured
these variables have produced ambiguous results. For instance, Pallak, Murroni,
and Koch (1984) obtained evidence supporting the predictions for message-
related, but not source-related cognitive responses, while Moore, Hausknecht,
and Thamodaran (1906) obtained the reverse pattern of results. Also, Petty,
Cacioppo and Goldman (1981) and Johnson and Scileppi (1969) found no
differences in message recall between involved and uninvolved subjects. In sum,
extant research provides strong support for direct effects due to source
credibility, but not for the mechanisms hypothesized to mediate these effects.
Third, virtually all of the evidence for source credibility effects has
concerned attitudes; effects on individual beliefs about brand attributes have
rarely been examined (for an exception, see Mizerski, Hunt, and Patti 1978).
However, belief measures can provide useful and relatively sensitive tests for
source credibility effects, and particularly so under conditions of central
processing when these effects are expected to be weak. More importantly, belief
measures may provide indirect tests of the mechanisms mediating these effects.
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Since subjects in a peripheral processing mode are not expected to process
attribute specific information in the ad, it is conceivable that their brand
attitude could produce strong halo effects on subsequent belief measures. If so,
source credibility should produce parallel effects on virtually all belief measures
as well on attitude. By contrast, subjects in a central processing mode may only
form those belief that are directly based on, or can be logically inferred from
the brand information provided in the ad. Thus, credibility should only influence
a select subset of (apriori identifiable) beliefs, and these effects may not
necessarily parallel the effect on attitude.
Fourth, virtually all of the source credibility research has had a persuasion
or yielding focus; effects on earlier information processing stages such as
attention have been virtually ignored. However, a credible source may play a
crucial role in the ad effects sequence by attracting attention to the ad
message. These attentional effects may be particularly crucial for uninvolved
audiences who may otherwise choose not to view and process the ad altogether.
Research that examines the effects of source credibility in natural viewing
environments (rather than in lab settings where attention is forced) and that
examines effects for ads with and without a credible source (rather than ads
endorsed by credible versus noncredible sources) should prove useful in isolating
credibility effects on attention, and also in examining the extent to which
attention levels moderate the credibility-attitude relationship.
Also note that an implicit assumption in virtually all of the research on
credibility effects is that audiences are persuaded (i.e., form attitudes towards
the advocacy object) during exposure to a communication, and differ only in the
persuasion route (central versus peripheral) they follow for judging attitude.
This may not be a valid assumption for uninvolved audiences. For instance,
Mitchell (1981, 1906) has argued that uninvolved audiences may completely
bypass brand evaluation by engaging in a nonbrand processing strategy, i.e., by
focussing attention on brand unrelated cues in the advertisement (also see
Gardner, Mitchell, and Russo 1985; Gardner 1985; Krugman 1965). Lichtenstein
and Srull (1985, 1987) have shown that subjects who do not form a brand
evaluation during ad exposure subsequently rely on recalled information from
the ad to construct a brand attitude when required to do so (also see Hastie
and Park 1986) . This suggests that the strength of credibility effects for
uninvolved audiences will depend on the accessibility of source versus message
cues at the time an attitudinal judgment is made (e.g., during purchase). The
strength of these effects may also depend on the level of involvement at the
time such a judgment is made. For instance, some audiences may be uninvolved
with an advertised brand during ad exposure, but they may become much more
involved with the brand as they approach purchase. If so, then one would
expect them to retrieve brand-related information from memory, and engage in
central processing during the purchase episode. In contrast, audiences who are
uninvolved with the brand during the ad viewing as well as the purchase
episode may be much more likely to minimize cognitive effort by retrieving and
relying on a peripheral cue such as source credibility to judge attitude prior to
purchase. Future research needs to take a dynamic view of involvement, and
consider the effects of change in involvement between the ad viewing and
purchase episodes to better understand the mechanisms mediating source
credibility effects on attitude that occur after ad exposure and processing.
Finally, note that much of the evidence for direct effects due to source
credibility is based on studies in which involvement with the advocacy issue was
manipulated to induce central versus peripheral processing. Unfortunately,
10
involvement is an individual difference variable that cannot be manipulated by
an advertiser to suit his communication objectives. However, recent research
suggests that other antecedents of motivation to process information such as
message tone (Pallak, Murroni, and Koch 1984), and mood induced by an
advertisement (Worth and Mackie 1987) , and ability to process information such
as media type (Chaiken and Eagly 1983), and time compression (Moore et al.
1986) could also moderate source credibility effects by inducing central versus
peripheral processing on the part of respondents. Research which examines the
simultaneous effects of source credibility and these types of variables should
prove useful because it would give advertisers insights about how they could
alter recipients' message processing strategy so as to maximize attitudinal
effects due to credibility.
Indirect Effects
Source credibility can also affect attitude indirectly by first influencing
the way in which people process and evaluate claims made in the persuasive
message. We consider two possibilities here, namely that credibility could either
influence the magnitude of message processing, or influence the (evaluative)
direction of processing. Since these two mediating mechanisms are predicted by
different theoretical perspectives, we consider each one separately.
Effects on Amount of Processing. The "central versus peripheral processing"
framework nicely accounts for source credibility effects under extreme levels of
motivation and ability to process message arguments. However, most persuasion
contexts are probably not characterized by extreme motivation and ability
levels. In recent years, Cacioppo and Petty (1984; Petty and Cacioppo 1986a,
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1986b) have proposed an extension of the "central/peripheral routes" framework
termed the elaboration likelihood model to account for persuasion processes
under moderate levels of involvement and ability. The ELM suggests that when
motivation to process a communication is at moderate levels, cues such as
credibility of the source will act neither as a message argument nor as a
peripheral cue. Rather, credibility will influence the amount of message
processing that audiences engage in (see Petty and Cacioppo 1986a for details).
For example, consider a situation in which a communication is somewhat
counterattitudinal, but the recipient is only moderately involved with the
advocacy issue and hence unsure about the extent to which (s)he should process
the communication. A counterattitudinal message clearly represents a threat to
the recipient's current beliefs and attitudes. A highly credible source intensifies
this threat, and should thus induce detailed evaluation of the message
arguments. In contrast, the threat perceived from a counterattitudinal message
should be lowered if the message is attributed to a source of low credibility.
This should allow recipients to assess the implications of the communication
without a detailed examination of its contents. Note that the effects of high
versus low credibility sources on the intensity of message processing will be
reversed if the communication is proattitudinal. Recipients will perceive a
greater threat if they receive a message they agree with from a source that
they do not trust. Consequently, a low credibility source should lead to greater
message processing for proattitudinal messages.
Empirical support for credibility effects on amount of message processing
comes from a study by Heesacker, Petty, and Cacioppo (1983) which examined
the effects of message quality (strong versus weak) and source credibility (high
versus low) on attitude towards a moderately involving and counterattitudinal
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topic (i.e., an issue whose consequences for the subjects were uncertain). As
expected, the credible source induced subjects to more deeply process message
claims, and thus intensified the effects of message quality on attitude. In
contrast, message quality had no effect on attitude when the message was
attributed to a source of low credibility. Stated differently, the low credibility
source diluted the effects of message quality by reducing recipients' motivation
to carefully scrutinize the message.
In sum, the ELM framework suggests that effects due to source credibility
under moderate involvement levels are contingent on the quality of the message
arguments as well as initial opinions of the audience members. If an
advertisement is targeted primarily at an unfavorable audience, then a highly
credible source should only be used if the claims made in the advertisement can
stand up to close scrutiny. If these claims are vacuous, then a credible source
would actually be dysfunctional since it would intensify message processing and
hence amplify the negative effects due to uncompelling arguments in the
message. It would also not be advisable to use a low credibility source, since
that would allow recipients to reject the message without engaging in message
processing. Instead, advertisers would do well to rely on other positive
peripheral cues (such as an attractive source or pleasant music) to create direct
attitudinal effects.
These recommendations are reversed for audiences who are initially
favorable. Specifically, favorable audiences will be more persuaded by a
compelling message if it is coupled with a source of questionable credibility,
since such a source would lead to more careful message scrutiny. A highly
credible source would only be advisable if it is desirable that the audience not
engage in detailed message processing. Such would clearly be the case when the
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advertised brand has no distinctive advantage over its competitors, and is hence
being supported by relatively vacuous claims.
Effects on Direction of Processing. Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt (1981)
(also see Sternthal, Phillips, and Dholakia 1978) suggest an alternative way in
which source credibility may affect attitude in a situation of moderate
involvement. These authors examine credibility effects within a cognitive
response model of persuasion. The cognitive response model (Greenwald 1968;
Wright 1973, 1980) asserts that the effects of a persuasive message on attitude
are mediated by the spontaneous thoughts or cognitive responses generated by
recipients during message exposure. If these responses are primarily negative
(i.e., counterarguments) then negative attitudes result. On the other hand,
predominantly positive responses (i.e., support arguments) lead to a more
favorable attitude towards the advocacy object.
A variable such as source credibility can influence attitudes by first
affecting the mix of counter/support arguments generated during the message
viewing episode. If the message is counterattitudinal, then recipients are
primarily predisposed to counterargue with the message regardless of the
credibility of the source. However, it is more difficult to counterargue with
statements made by a credible or expert source. Thus, a credible source should
inhibit counterargumentation and hence lead to a more favorable attitude. In
contrast, a proattitudinal message will primarily predispose recipients to support
argue. If the message is attributed to a source lacking in credibility, recipients
will believe that the source is not qualified to adequately represent the issue
that they support. Consequently, a source of moderate or low credibility will
actually bolster the recipient's natural tendency to engage in support
argumentation, and hence further polarize the already favorable attitude. In
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sum, source credibility is expected to influence attitude by first affecting the
direction rather than the intensity of thinking.
It should be noted that the framework discussed above was originally
presented as a general representation of source credibility effects regardless of
level of involvement. Subsequently, Sternthal, Phillips, and Dholakia (1978)
argued that credibility would likely affect message processing only when
involvement was not at extremely high levels. Since the cognitive response
model has generally been recognized as not adequately dealing with low
involvement message processing situations, it appears that the Sternthal et al.
framework is primarily suitable in situations of moderate issue involvement.
A key prediction of the Sternthal et al. framework is that credible sources
will be persuasive if recipients have an initial negative opinion towards the
advocacy issue, but will actually operate as a persuasive liability for initially
positive recipients . This predicted interaction between source credibility and
initial opinion has been supported in a number of studies (Bock and Saine 1975;
Harmon and Coney 1982; Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt 1978). Note, however,
that the ELM model makes an identical prediction if the quality of persuasive
messages is assumed to be high. Since all three of the studies listed above
employed reasonably compelling arguments in their experimental communications,
these studies do not differentiate the ELM model from the framework proposed
by Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt (1978).
Although the ELM model and the Sternthal et al. framework generate
identical predictions when message quality is strong, it is worth emphasizing
that the mediating mechanisms for credibility effects postulated by the two
approaches are conceptually distinct. The ELM suggests that source credibility
influences the extent to which a message is processed. Consequently, credibility
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simply serves to amplify or weaken the effects of other variables (such as
message quality) on attitude. In contrast the Sternthal et al. framework
proposes that credibility modifies the way in which message arguments are
interpreted independent of the quality of these arguments. Consequently, a
compelling test of the two frameworks requires an examination of credibility
effects for strong as well as weak messages. Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt
(1978) predict no difference in the source credibility by initial opinion
interaction as a function of message quality, while the ELM framework predicts
a three-way interaction, i.e., a source of high (low) credibility is expected to
polarize effects due to variations in message quality when initial opinion is
negative (positive). Evidence from Heesacker, Petty, and Cacioppo (1983) thus
appears to support the ELM framework. However, more research is clearly
needed before the precise mechanism for source effects under moderate
involvement levels is clearly understood.
Finally, both frameworks make similar predictions regarding the durability
of credibility effects, and the appropriate timing for source introduction in the
message. Source credibility effects on attitude under moderate involvement are
expected to be based on the amount and direction of message processing.
Consequently, these effects should be durable and resistant to counterattack,
and should be observed only when the identity of the source is revealed early
in the communication.
Needed Research. Since the frameworks proposed by Petty and Cacioppo
(1986a) and Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt (1978) propose different mediating
mechanisms for source credibility effects, an important priority for future
research should be to develop critical tests which pit these frameworks against
each other. As noted earlier, an experiment which manipulates initial opinion, ad
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message quality, and source credibility can provide such a test. Additional tests
can be generated by examining cognitive response data. Since ELM predicts that
source credibility effects are mediated by the amount of message processing
that audiences engage in, credibility should influence the total number of
message-related cognitive responses, but should not influence the mix of these
CRs (i.e., counter versus support arguments). By contrast, credibility effects on
the direction of processing (as predicted by Sternthal et al) should be reflected
in the mix of message-related CRs.
Even stronger tests for the two competing frameworks can be generated
by examining the moderating influence of variables which are known to
influence either the amount of ad message processing, or the direction of ad
message processing (but not both). One such variable may be ability to process.
Since ability to process (as determined by intrinsic factors such as prior
knowledge, or extrinsic factors such as distraction) is likely to influence the
magnitude, but not the direction of message processing, ability should interact
with source credibility under ELM, but not under the Sternthal et al framework.
For instance, Figure 1 presents the results we might expect under the ELM
framework (panels a, b, and c) and under the Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt
(1978) framework (panels d, e, and f) from a hypothetical experiment in which
moderately involved subjects are exposed to a counterattitudinal message in a 2
(high versus low source credibility) by 2 (strong versus weak message quality)
by 3 (high, moderate, and low ability to process) factorial design. Under ELM,
source credibility should strongly polarize the effects of message quality on
attitude when ability is high. As ability drops to moderate levels, so should the
strength of polarizing effects due to source credibility. Finally, at low levels of
ability, subjects should switch into a peripheral processing mode, and thus
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manifest a simple credibility main effect. In contrast, the Sternthal et al.
framework predicts identical credibility effects regardless of level of the ability
factor.
Analogously, forewarning subjects about the persuasive intent of a
counterattitudinal message is likely to put them in an anticipatory
counterargumentative mode (Petty and Cacioppo 1977), i.e., influence the
direction of message processing rather than the magnitude of processing.
Consequently, the Sternthal et al framework predicts an interactive effect due
to forewarning and source credibility on attitude -- credibility effects should be
stronger for audiences who are forewarned. In contrast, The ELM predicts no
differences in credibility effects as a function of forewarning. In sum, future
experimental research of the type discussed here should provide the basis for
"strong inference" in the study of source credibility effects by supporting one
proposed explanation for these effects while simultaneously rejecting the other.
Conclusion
Our review of the literature suggests that source credibility can operate in
a persuasion environment in several distinct capacities -- as a persuasive
argument, as a peripheral cue, or as a variable that influences the intensity
and/or direction of active message processing. Figure 2 displays each of these
mediating mechanisms, while Table 1 summarizes the conditions under which
they are likely to operate, prior empirical support, and implications for the use
of credible sources in advertising.
The ELM framework, and the cognitive response framework proposed by
Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt (1978) have emerged in only the last decade or
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so, and yet they provide a rich conceptual network of propositions and ideas
that can be used to develop extremely subtle and complex predictions
concerning credibility effects in persuasion contexts. Unfortunately, theoretical
development has far outpaced empirical research in this area --in many
instances, direct empirical support for well developed hypotheses is simply
nonexistent.
Perhaps the area in most pressing need of future research concerns
credibility effects under moderate involvement situations. It seems likely that
recipients of advertising messages are frequently uncertain about the
consequences of the advertised brand to their personal lives. Extant literature
suggests that credibility effects under such conditions may occasionally be
negative, and could be accounted for by more than one mediating mechanism.
Moreover, it is possible that the two proposed mechanisms may operate in
parallel, or one may dominate the other as a function of other (as yet
unspecified) variables in the ad reception environment. These important issues
have received virtually no attention in the literature. Indeed, we found very few
studies that were explicitly designed to examine the hows and whys of
credibility effects under moderate involvement. The study by Heesacker, Petty,
and Cacioppo (1983) is an exception in that it provides compelling support for
predictions derived from the ELM in a counterattitudinal situation. However,
predictions of this framework for credibility effects on an initially favorable
audience have never been tested. Furthermore, neither the ELM nor the
Sternthal et al. framework makes any predictions concerning credibility effects
for audiences that are neutral towards, or have no initial opinion about the
communication object. This is clearly a research area with tremendous
theoretical and practical consequences.
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Finally, it should be noted that much of our discussion in this paper is
based on persuasion studies reported in the psychology literature. There is
clearly no guarantee that effects and mediators uncovered in lab studies
involving simple, verbal messages will generalize to more complex ad reception
environments. There is a need for constructive replication designed to "fix"
these effects in environments relevant to advertising and marketing
practitioners.
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TABLE 1
Summary of Mechanisms Mediating Source Credibility Effects
Determining condition Empirical support Implications
Direct Effects: Credibility as a persuasive argument
High motivation/
High ability
Dean, Austin, and
Watts (1975)
1.
2.
3.
4.
Effects are always positive.
Effects are relatively
enduring.
Timing of source
identification will not
influence these effects.
Magnitude of effects
influenced by other central
cues (e.g., ad message
quality)
.
Direct Effects: Credibility as a peripheral cue
Low motivation/
Low ability
Johnson and Scileppi
(1969)
Rhine and Severance
(1970)
McGinnies
(1973)
Andreoli and Worchel
(1978)
Mizerski, Hunt,
and Patti (1978)
Petty, Cacioppo,
and Goldman (1981)
Pallak, Murroni, and
Koch (1984)
Worth and Mackie
(1987)
1.
2.
3.
4.
Effects are always positive
Effects are transient and
likely to decay rapidly.
Timing of source identific-
ation will not influence
these effects.
Magnitude of effects is
influenced by other
peripheral cues (e.g.
source attractiveness.
TABLE 1 (continued)
Determining condition Empirical support Implications
Indirect Effects: Effects on the amount of processing
Moderate Heesacker, Petty, 1. Nature of effects (positive
motivation and Cacioppo or negative) is contingent
(1983) on (a) recipient's prior
opinion and (b) ad message
quality
2. Effects are relatively
enduring.
3. These effects will be
observed only when source
is identified before
message.
4. Magnitude of effects is
moderated by other
variables (e.g., ability
to process message) that
influence amount of ad
message processing.
Indirect Effects: Effects on the direction of processing
Moderate Bock and Saine 1. Nature of effects (positive
motivation (1975) or negative) is contingent
on recipient's prior
Sternthal, Dholakia, opinion
and Leavitt 2. Effects are relatively
(1978) enduring.
3. These effects will be
Harmon and Coney observed only when source
(1982) is identified before
message.
4. Magnitude of effects is
moderated by other
variables (e.g.,
forewarning) that
influence direction of ad
message processing.
FIGURE 1
Source Credibility Effects as a Function of Ability to Process
the Ad Message: Differential Predictions as Derived from the ELM
and Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt (1978) Framework 1
ELM Predictions
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FIGURE 2
Alternative Mediation routes for Credibility Effects on Attitude
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message processing)
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